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Disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: Communication Tactics and
Grand Strategies
Chin-Chung Chao1 and Dexin Tian2
Abstract
This study explores the communication tactics and grand strategies of each of the
involved parties in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. Under the theoretical
balance between liberal optimists and realist pessimists and through the hermeneutic
analysis of the primary data of relevant remarks of governmental officials, official
statements, letters and memoranda, declassified CIA reports, interview transcripts of
scholars and experts, relevant media reports and readers’ online responses from the
LexisNexis news database and Google News website as well as secondary data of
relevant study results of scholars and researchers, we found that the Japanese have
been secretive and opportunistic, the Americans calculated and one-sided, the
Taiwanese cooperative and compromising, and the Chinese assertive and ambitious.
As grand strategies, Japan plans to become a normal state with a normal army for
regional and global leadership. The US makes sure that it has no rivals in all aspects
regardless of its close ally Japan or trade-partner China so as to maintain hegemonic
supremacy in the world. Taiwan adopts a grand strategy of accommodation and
compromise to raise the confidence level in its political identity and economic
integration. China pursues its peaceful development by accelerating economic
growth, building up defensive military forces, and creating a favorable international
environment. The findings provide valuable understanding of the international
nature of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island disputes and insight into a long list of similar
territorial and bordering issues in the East and South China Seas.
Keywords: Communication tactics, grand strategies, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
disputes

For decades, there have been intensifying maritime territorial clashes in both
the Each China Sea and South China Sea.
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In the East China Sea, the disputes over the sovereignty of a group of islands
between the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and Japan since the 1970s,
which also involve the Republic of Taiwan (ROC or Taiwan) and the US, have
become so frequent and intense that they are considered “one of the most burning
matters in Sino-Japanese relations and even in East Asian politics at large”
(HagstrÖm, 2005, p. 160). Taking the intensity of the situation into consideration, the
US has recently passed a resolution, reaffirming its strong support “for the peaceful
resolution of territorial sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific
maritime domains” (Senate Resolution 167, 2013, p. 1).
The disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands came to the open when the
United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported, “a
high probability exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be
one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world” (Emery, et al. 1969, pp. 39-41).
Since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands sit right in the middle of the reported oil and gas
deposits, periodic tensions and conflicts as well as nation-wide campaigns over the
sovereignty of these islands have been witnessed among Japan, China, and Taiwan
since the 1970s with growing intensity and increasing scales. All claimants stick to
their claims with no inch of compromise for the strategic significance of the islands
and national interests as well as national identity at the same time.
To make the issue more complicated, the US took control and administered
the islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands from 1953 till 1971 (Manyin, 2013). In 1971,
the US returned the Ryukyu Islands including the administrative rights of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. For its own
national interests, the US “has never taken a position on sovereignty, but we have
made it very clear that the islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations, and the
obligation to defend Japan” as stressed by former US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton (Remarks by Hillary Clinton, 2010, para. 22). The disputes over these islands
and the reactions of the involved parties have already caused waves of sensation all
over the world. Valencia (2007) warned, “disputes over small islands and ocean space
may become the tail that wags the dog of international relations” (p. 128).
Kristof (2010) also stressed, “this is a boundary dispute that could get ugly
and some day have far-reaching consequences for China, Japan, Taiwan and the
United States” (p. 1).
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Thus, we can see that there are roughly two sides of four parties in the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. While China, Taiwan and Japan are claimants in the
disputes, the US is siding with Japan as a deeply-involved party. Although there are
different motives in each of the involved parties, China has been supporting Taiwan
in its claim over the sovereignty of the islands under the jurisdiction of Yilan County
whereas the US has been backing up Japan in its declaration of the islands as part of
Okinawa of Japan. In the process of this decade-long disputes, China is looming large
as a big rising power, the US is defending its world supremacy, and Japan and Taiwan
have never been contented with their international images. To us communication
scholars, the disputes under discussion are international and cross-cultural in nature
and each party is fighting for its own national interests and reestablishing its expected
national identity in the process. In this study, we aim to focus on the major conflicts
in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes by exploring the communication tactics and
grand strategies of each of the involved parties. Before specifying our research
questions for the realization of our research purposes, we conduct the following
literature review as our research foundation and academic guidance.
Literature Review
For the purposes of our study, we draw from and contribute to three
categories of literature: (1) the geographical information of the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Island and the claimants’ sovereignty claims; (2) the major conflicts in the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes; and (3) the nature of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
disputes.
The geographical information and the claimants’ sovereignty claims. The
islands under discussion used to be called the Pinnacle Islands in English. Today, they
are better known as Diaoyu Islands in China, Diaoyutai in Taiwan, and Senkakus in
Japan. As an archipelago, the islands are located in the East China Sea “about 100
nautical miles northeast of Chi-lung, the major northern port of Taiwan,” and
“approximately 220 nautical miles from Naha, Okinawa, and Fu-chou, China”
(Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (CIA, 1971).
Altogether, the islands consist of five islets and three rocky outcroppings with
a total landmass of less than 7 square kilometers or 3 square miles. Japan nationalized
three of the islands on September 25, 2012.
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The largest island is about two miles in length and less than one mile in width.
None of the islands are inhabited or have had any human economic activities from
indigenous resources. Appendix A provides an updated map of the disputed islands
by Centanni (2013). Based on “Dioayu Dao: An Inherent Territory of China (White
Paper of PRC)” (State Council Information Office of PRC, 2012) and the Official
Statement of “The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of the
Republic of China (Official Statement of ROC)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
ROC), we can summarize the sovereignty claims of China and Taiwan as follows:
1) The Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands are an inseparable part of Yilan County of
Taiwan. Since PRC considers Taiwan part of China; therefore, the islands are part of
the Chinese territory; 2) The islands were discovered, named, and used by the Chinese
for centuries; 3) The islands are the prolongation of the East China Sea continental
shelf, with the black trench separating the territorial waters of Taiwan and Ryukyu or
today’s Okinawa; 4) Japan’s occupation of the islands in 1895 during the first SinoJapanese War of 1894-1895 is illegal and invalid; and 5) The islands were returned to
China in accordance with the international legal documents of the Cairo Declaration in
1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation in 1945.
In “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (The Basic
View of Japan)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013b) and Q&A on the
Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013a), Japan sticks to the
following claims: 1) The Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japan as terra nullius
by a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895 after repeated surveys, and Japan
demonstrated continuous state authority on them henceforth; 2) The islands were not
included in the territory of Taiwan, which had been ceded to Japan according to the
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895; 3) The islands were not as part of the territory that Japan
had to give up but as part of the territory under US management in accordance with
Items No 2 and No. 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951; 4) The islands were
returned to Japan with the Ryukyu Islands by the US in 1971, and China and Taiwan
never raised any objections until potential oil reserves were identified in the region;
and 5) Maps of China and textbooks in Taiwan used to recognize the islands as
Japanese territory; therefore, there exists no disputes of the sovereignty over these
islands.
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The Major Conflicts in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. According
to Burton (1990), disputes are confrontations that can be resolved by means of
negotiation or arbitration whereas conflicts refer to long-term, deeply-rooted issues
which are non-negotiable. In accordance with Burton’s definition of conflicts, there
have been four major conflicts in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes based on The
Basic View of Japan, White Paper of PRC, Official Statement of ROC and the study
results of scholars (e.g.: Beukel, 2011; Drifte, 2013; Shaw, 1999; Swaine, 2013).
The 1885-1895 conflict. Japan claimed that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were
found terra nullius or uninhabited and incorporated into its territory by virtue of a
Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895 after thorough surveys since 1885 (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013b). Both China and Taiwan hold that the islands were
first discovered, named, and used by the Chinese since the 14th century. Japan seized
the opportunity of China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 to annex
the islands with the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on April 17, 1895, three months after
its Cabinet Decision (State Council Information Office of PRC, 2012; Shaw, 1999).
The 1951-1972 conflict. Japan insisted that, under the San Francisco Peace Treaty
of 1951, it renounced Taiwan but maintained territorial sovereignty over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The US, which administrated the Ryukyu Islands from 1953
to 1971, returned the Ryukyu Islands including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Japan
under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971. Neither China nor Taiwan made any
objections to the above stipulations until potential oil reserves were identified in the
region in 1971 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013b).
To both China and Taiwan, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were returned to
China after World War II. However, it is the US that arbitrarily included the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands under the US trusteeship in the 1950s and decided to return
the administration power over them to Japan in the 1970s under the Okinawa Reversion
Treaty, which was signed without the presence and agreement of neither China nor
Taiwan (State Council Information Office of PRC, 2012). The governments of both
China and Taiwan filed solemn official protests, but they did not alter the US
decision. Therefore, China and Taiwan consider the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971
invalid and the authorization of Japanese administrative power over the islands illegal.
In May 1972, “thousands of overseas Chinese students mainly from Taiwan and
Hong Kong participated in protest marches in major U.S. cities” (Shaw, 1999, p. 14).
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The 1989-1997 conflict. While China was under extreme pressure from the
Western World due to its 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Japan was preparing to
approve the lighthouse on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands erected in 1978 by the
Japanese right-wing group, Nihon Seinensha or Japan Youth Federation, as an
“official navigation indicator” (Shaw, 1999). By the same token, the same right-wing
group set up a five-meter, solar powered, aluminum lighthouse on another island of
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands “as Chinese sensitivities had been heightened by the
Taiwan Straight crisis of 1995-6” (Beukel, 2011, p. 12). In 1996, the Japanese Diet
officially ratified the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the UN
Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLS), which covered the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands. Since then, Japan began excluding foreign fishing in its EEZ by vessels and
helicopters from the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency.
As responses, the governments of both China and Taiwan condemned the
lighthouse erections as a violation of Chinese sovereignty, and a front-page editorial in
the People’s Daily declared: “Whoever expects the 1.2 billion Chinese people to give up
even an inch of their territory is only daydreaming” (Downs & Saunders, 1998/99, p.
133). As a signatory of the UNCLS, China also clarified its 200-mile EEZ, which
included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, overlapping the declared EEZ of Japan.
Besides, thousands of emotional “Baodiao” or defending the Diaoyu Islands
demonstrators went to the streets of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
The 2012-the present conflict. Provoked by the Japanese Central
Government’s decision on a trawler collision with the ships of the Japanese coast
guards in 2010 and taking advantage of the US pivot or rebalancing strategy in the
Asia-Pacific region since 2011, then Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara announced
that Tokyo Municipal Government would raise 2.05 billion yen or $26 million to
purchase three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in order to assert Japanese sovereignty.
With the intention to prevent a bigger crisis in the relation with China, the Japanese
government under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda spent the same amount
purchasing the three islands and nationalized them.
Seeing that there is no need to respect the status quo any longer, China
publicly declared its territorial sea baselines around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. For
the first time, China claimed that the islands are under Chinese administration. In late
2012, there appeared large-scale, numerous, and sometimes violent demonstrations in
the streets of China, Taiwan, and Japan.
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Since then, there has been “an ongoing pattern of potentially dangerous
interactions between Chinese and Japanese air and naval vessels jostling for position
in or near the islands’ territorial air space and waters” (Swaine, 2013, p. 1).
The nature of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. The
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes are complicated and multifaceted because of
historical, economic and symbolic significance. The complexity of the disputes is, in
the words of Pan (2007),
not only in its multiple and interrelated foci such as its ownership, its return,
and the demarcation of the Sino-Japanese maritime boundary, but also in its
entanglement with other problems in bilateral relations, both China and Japan’s
domestic politics, and their respective broad foreign relations as well. (p. 87)
As mentioned earlier, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes involve two sides
of China and Taiwan as the accusers and Japan and the US as the defenders, and each
of the four parties has its own motives and goals throughout the disputes. According
to Blanchard (2000), the value of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands lies in “the rights they
convey to energy and rich fishing grounds, the proximity they afford to strategic sea
lanes, and the relevance they have to other territorial disputes” (p. 122). Below is an
account of the three aspects of significance.
Historical significance. According to Zhu (2011), the Diaoyuyu/Senkaku
Islands disputes are just a trigger of conflicts between China and Japan. Actually, one
of the main reasons behind the disputes is “the mistrust between Japan and China
related to history” (p. 2). Since 1900, Japan secretly changed the name of the islands
from Diaoyu to Senkaku, and China and Taiwan were left “unaware that the
uninhabited ‘Senkaku Islands’ were in fact the former Diaoyu Islands” (Shaw, 2012,
para. 15). For decades, Japan kept revising its history textbooks for school students by
replacing “Shinlyaku” meaning “invade” with “Shinnshutsu” meaning “enter” in the
accounts of Japanese occupation of China during World War II (1937-1945). There
are historical documents and photographs from “Western businessmen and
missionaries who remained in Nanking” (Yale Divinity School Library, 2008),
showing that the Japanese soldiers killed about 300,000 Chinese including women and
children during the Nanjing Massacre from December 1937 to January 1938.
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However, today’s Japanese tend to believe that either the number of the dead
Chinese was exaggerated or the Massacre itself is a fake narrative (Shudo, Susumu &
Shinjiro, 2005). It is true that Japan “formally apologized in 1993 to the women who
were forced into wartime brothels for Japanese soldiers, and in 1995 to nations that
suffered from Japanese aggression during the war,” as Fackler (2013, para. 2)
reported. It is also true that ultranationalists in Japan and hawkish government
officials like, Shinzo Abe, the current Prime Minister have kept “whitewashing Japan’s
wartime atrocities” (Fackler, 2013, para. 2), “visiting the Yasukuni Shrine where 1068
convicted war criminals together with 13 Class A war criminals were secretly
enshrined” (War Criminals, 2003, para. 3), and “planning to rewrite Japan’s 66-yearold pacifist constitution” (Hayashi, 2013, para. 2). Most seriously, the Japanese
government today denies the existence of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes even
though “both governments agreed to shelve the issue when the two countries
normalized their diplomatic relations in 1972 and concluded their Peace and Friendship
Treaty in 1978” (Drifte, 2013, p. 17). Thus, there is a “mutual denial of status
recognition between China and Japan” (Yang, 2008, p. 273). Without taking sufficient
cautions from both Japan and China, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes could
become a second Marco Polo Bridge Event, a self-created excuse for a bigger plot.
Economic
significance.
Economically,
sovereignty
over
the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands could “convey exclusive economic rights to nearly 20,000
square nautical miles of undersea resources” (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008, pp. 903-904).
It means that control of the islands would confer ownership of natural resources such
as fishery and potential oil and gas reserves in their vicinity. The islands, which are
located on the eastern edge of the continental margin in the East China Sea, exerts
great impact on “both China and Japan’s increasingly voracious appetite for energy,
natural resources, and extension into the high seas” (Pan, 2007, p. 72). Meanwhile, the
sovereignty over the islands “can be a factor that significantly influences the location
of a maritime boundary between China and Japan” (p. 84). With China’s continuous
economic growth, especially surpassing Japan as the second-largest economy in 2010,
Japan felt increasingly threatened as it does not “accept China’s claim of benignity or
‘peaceful rise’, nor does it recognize the legitimacy of a putative Chinese hegemony in
East Asia” (Goh, 2011, p. 8).

Chao & Tian

27

Symbolic significance. Since both China and Japan have maritime territorial
disputes with their neighboring countries, both have been making the greatest efforts
avoiding any potential negative domino effect in the handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands disputes. Just as Koo (2009) noted, any concessions in the disputes “could
possibly jeopardize their respective claims to the other disputed islands” (p. 206).
Furthermore, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes can also vent particular
viewpoints of the rapidly growing nationalism and passionate thirst for national
identity in all the claimants’ respective countries. This is why Suganuma (2000)
remarked: “If there is a flash point to ignite a third Sino-Japanese War, it will be the
disputes over the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea” (p. 151). In
short, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes are not just territorial. They bear chaineffect significance in the grand strategies in the national interests and strengthening or
revising processes of national identities of the involved parties.
Therefore, the hope of an immediate and effective solution to the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes seems pessimistically dim and distant. As
communication scholars, we intend to provide another perspective on the prospect of
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes by realizing the aims of this study as listed at the
end of the introductory part. To this end, we raise the following two research
questions (RQ): RQ1: What are the communication tactics in the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands disputes? RQ2: What grand strategies do the involved parties intend to fulfill
in the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes?
In this study, communication tactics mean the carefully planned verbal and
nonverbal behaviors in public interactions. Grand strategies refer to the purposeful
employment of all available instruments of power, especially military forces for the
long-term goals of a country. Answers to these questions will help understanding the
international nature, the claimants’ claims, and the conflicts of the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Island disputes. They will also provide insight into a long list of similar territorial and
bordering issues concerning the three claimants as well as the US as a deeply-involved
party in the said disputes and only superpower in the present-day world.
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Theoretical Frameworks
To comprehend territorial or bordering disputes and conflicts, there are two
camps of scholars in general. While liberals argue that territorial disputes lose their
salience as a result of increasing economic interdependence, realists counter-argue that
economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace but also increases conflicts
due to asymmetric dependence and inequality between economic partners. According
to Cronin and Kaplan (2012), the arguments of both liberal optimists and realist
pessimists provide the most helpful theoretical lenses for maritime territorial disputes.
Liberal optimists believe in the pacifying power resulting from economic
interdependence, international institutions, and democratization.
First, it is the strong belief of liberal optimists that bilateral economic
exchanges result in shared interests and good relations between states. In other words,
“the greater the volume of the trade and investment flowing between two countries,
the more groups of people on both sides will have a strong interest in avoiding
conflicts and preserving peace” (Cronin & Kaplan, 2012, p. 12). Second, besides using
trade as an instrument of peace, liberal optimists also attach great importance to the
role of various international institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regional and
international institutions can help “improving communication between states,
reducing uncertainty about intentions, and increasing the capacity of governments to
make credible, binding commitments to one another” on one hand. On the other,
they can also help to “ease or counteract some of the pernicious effects of
international anarchy by clearing the way for higher levels of cooperation and trust
than would otherwise be attainable” (p. 13). Finally, liberal optimists find that
democratic states rarely go to war with one another because “regimes that rely for
their power and legitimacy on the consent of the governed are less likely to enter
lightly into military adventures.” Therefore, “as the number of democracies in the
world increases, the likelihood of international conflicts should diminish” (p. 15).
In contrast, realist pessimists find “recurrent struggles for power and survival
inescapable laws of nature and human history is a vicious circle” (Cronin & Kaplan,
2012, pp. 16-17). They believe that “it is the material power and, in particular, the
military strength of the various units in an international system that has typically been
decisive in shaping the patterns of relations among them” (p. 17).
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Vasquez (1997) summarized the shared fundamental assumptions of the
realist pessimists about the world. Briefly, they assume that (1) nation-states are the
most important actors in international relations; (2) international relation is a struggle
for power and peace; (3) international anarchy brings about disorder and disputes.
Due to the complicated and multifaceted nature of the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands disputes, we looked through the theoretical lenses of both liberal optimists
and realist pessimists for our study. Just as Jervis (1991/92) noted, “only rarely does a
single factor determine the way politics will work out” (p. 40). Gaddis (1992/93)
seconded, “significant outcomes are invariably shaped by the convergence or
intersection of complementary processes or even the potential fratricide of
contradictory ones” (p. 44).
Research Methods
For the purposes of this study, we collected our primary data from relevant
speeches or remarks1 of governmental officials from Japan, the US, China, and
Taiwan, official statements2, and historical records in the form of
treaties/declarations/agreements, official letters and memoranda as well as
declassified CIA reports3. We also included interview transcripts of scholars and
experts4, relevant media reports and readers’ online responses from both the
LexisNexis news database and Google News website5, and study results of scholars
and researchers. The standards we adopted for the selection of our primary data are
threefold: up-to-date, representative, and authoritative.
For data analysis, we adopted hermeneutics to interpret the interactions in the
above-mentioned communication artifacts of Japan, China, Taiwan and the US. Byrne
(2001) explained, hermeneutics is usually used for the interpretation and
understanding of texts derived from stories, interviews, participant observations,
letters, speeches, or other relevant written documents and personal experiences.
Girish (2008) further clarified, as an art of interpreting, hermeneutics developed into a
theory of human understanding through the works of Scheleiermacher, Dilthey,
Heideggar, Gadamar, and Derrida. The essence of hermeneutics is that “the
concealed import of a text cannot be understood without uncovering the historical
contact and the sociocultural milieu of the community on which it is based” (p. 2).
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This means that, to thoroughly and appropriately analyze a text, it is essential
to understand the origin of the text along with its historical and cultural backgrounds.
Thus, the selected texts in this study are closely examined in connection to their
relevant historical and socio-cultural contexts for the generation of themes or patterns
as research findings, which reflect the knowledge of the phenomenon under study. To
reduce subjectivity during the whole process of our analysis, the two authors
independently coded the selected artifacts, analyzed them comparatively at the
message level, and kept exchanging notes, views, and conclusions of their analyzed
results in accordance with the above theoretical and methodological guidelines.
Findings and Analysis
Our research findings are twofold: the communication tactics of the four
parties in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes and their respective grand strategies.
Below is a detailed account and critical analysis of first the communication tactics and
then the grand strategies of each involved party.
Communication Tactics
The secretive and opportunistic Japanese. The Japanese side has been
secretive and opportunistic when they integrated the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands into
their territory in 1895 and flared up most of the four major conflicts as described
above. In its Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
(2013a) claimed, the Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japan as terra nullius with
a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895 after thorough surveys, and Japan
demonstrated continuous state authority on them henceforth. However, “official
Chinese and Ryukyu documents confirmed that there existed no land without owner
between the two neighboring countries [of China and the Ryukyu Kingdom]”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China b, para. 6). Even the so-called
“thorough surveys” were incomplete as can be seen from the following declassified
correspondence between the Japanese officials then:
Your letter of inquiry, Secret No. 34, concerning the formation of the harbors
and other related matters of Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima [Diaoyu/Senkaku] has
been received. However, ever since the said islands were investigated by police
agencies of Okinawa Prefecture back in 1885, there have been no subsequent field
surveys conducted. As a result, it is difficult to provide any specific reports on them.
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(Shaw, 1999, p. 82) Although the Japanese government knew that “the
aforementioned islands are close to the border of China… and China has already
given names to the islands,” (Shaw, 1999, p. 75), it waited from 1885 to 1895 for the
appropriate occasion and incorporated the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands into Japanese
territory on January 14, 1895. The date of this decision is just three months before
China was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War (Aug. 1, 1894-April 17, 1895).
Moreover, the decision “was carried out in total secrecy and was never notified to
concerned states, in particular, Qing China” (p. 99). Besides being secretive in the
occupation the islands in the 1885-1895 conflict, Japan has been taking advantage of
opportunities in other conflicts as well.
For example, the 1951-1972 conflict occurred because the governments of
Japan and the US excluded China and Taiwan and completed their backroom deals by
exchanging administrative power over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for the long-term
rights of military bases in Okinawa. On August 6, 1948, a declassified report from the
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recorded that the Prime Minister of Japan sent
a message to the US State Department in January 1951, agreeing to “give the US all
required military rights there” for “transferring title to the Ryukyus and Bonins” (p.
107). The US agreed and former US Secretary of State Dulles claimed that Japan had
“residual sovereignty” in the Ryukyu Islands, which means: “The United States will
not transfer its sovereign powers [administrative, legislative, and jurisdiction] over the
Ryukyu Islands to any nation other than Japan” (p. 109). Commenting on such
backroom deals, Price (2001) sharply noted, the San Francisco Peace Treaty “left in its
wake not only a divided China, but also numerous other territorial disputes that the
U.S. military is only too pleased to use in justifying its continuing presence in the
region” (p. 6).
Regarding the purchase and nationalization of three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands, the Japanese side is both opportunistic and misleading. To start with, ultranationalist Shintaro Ishihara intended to “purchase the islands back in the 1970s”
(Drifte, 2013, p. 36). As Governor of Tokyo then, Shintaro Ishihara felt very
disappointed at the weakness in the Noda Administration towards China in dealing
with the trawler collision case in 2010. When the US began implementing its rebalance strategy in the Asia-Pacific region in 2011, Governor Ishihara regarded it as a
golden opportunity.
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He announced that he would collect donations and purchase three of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the name of Tokyo Metropolitan Government, with
further plans to construct port facilities and other constructions. He chose his
announcement “for maximum effect on the occasion of a speech at the conservative
Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation on April 16, 2012” (Tatsumi, 2013, p.
117). With the intention to “prevent an irreversible damage to Japan-China
relations… and assuming that China would understand the reason,” (pp. 117-118)
then Prime Minister Noda announced that the Japanese Central Government would
purchase and nationalize the three islands. In the words of Tatsumi (2013), this “was
the lesser evil of the two options” (p. 118). However, instead of lessening the tension
between the two countries, the nationalization of the three islands by the Noda
Administration added fuel to the fire and intensified the degree and scope of the
conflict. From the subsequent consequences in the worsening Japan-China bilateral
relationship, it is reasonable to suspect that the latter might be the genuine intention
of the Japanese government.
The calculated and one-sided Americans. As the architect of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes, the US first asked if China would take the Ryukyu
Islands including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1943, then granted Japan the residual
sovereignty over these islands in 1965, and kept backing up Japan in words and deeds
ever since. When World War II was drawing to an end and when Chiang Kai-shek,
former President and Generalissimo of ROC met US President Roosevelt in Cairo in
November 1943, Roosevelt “enquired more than once whether China would want the
Ryukyu Islands” (US Department of State, 1943, p. 324). Although Chiang agreed
with a joint occupation with the US, the US completely changed its mind by granting
Japan residual sovereignty over the islands. A declassified US State Department
memorandum on the Ryukyus reads: “We recognize that Japan maintains residual
sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, and have agreed to return them to full Japanese
control as soon as Free World security interests permit” (Smith, 2013, pp. 29-30).
The change in the US position resulted from two major reasons. On the one
hand, the US sought to cultivate Japan instead of Chiang’s ROC as a key ally against
the former Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. On August
6, 1948, a report from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (1948) noted, “the
failure of the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa since the end of the war indicates the
impracticability of awarding the Ryukyus to the Nationalists” (p.3). The report also
emphasized:
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Recognition of China’s claims would involve a tremendous risk. Chinese
control might easily deny use of the bases to the US, and, in the event of final
subjugation of the Nationalist forces by the Communists, might give the Soviets easy
access to the Islands. (p. 3)
Thus, Japan was to replace Chiang’s China as a new ally of the US and, as a
result, got rewarded with the expected ownership of the Ryukyus including the
administrative power over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
On the other hand, the US was reluctant to lose ROC to Communist PRC as
a US ally and felt challenged by the potential domino effect of spreading
Communism. Excluding China at the San Francisco Peace Treaty conference in 1951,
the US was determined to make Japan “align it with the West and alienate it from
Asia” and “the Pacific an America lake” (Price, 2001, p. 13). To ensure the success of
its pivot strategy to the Asian-Pacific region today, the US continues supporting Japan
in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. On November 29, 2012, the US Senate
approved Amendment No. 3275 to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act,
announcing:
While the United States takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the
Senkaku Islands, the United States acknowledges the administration of Japan over the
Senkaku Islands…. The United States rearrirms its commitment to the Government
of Japan under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
(Congressional Record, Senate 2012, p. 7201)
The amendment is meant to counter China’s attempts to challenge Japan’s
administration of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Should China try to attack or take
over the islands, the US will fight with Japan against China under its treaty
commitment. Earlier, former Defense Secretary Panetta announced in Singapore on
June 1, 1012 that by 2020 the US “will have 60 percent of its naval forces in the
Pacific and 40 percent in the Atlantic” (Wan, 2012, para. 2).
The cooperative and compromising Taiwanese. To demonstrate that the
Taiwanese side has been cooperative and compromising in the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands disputes, we provide two examples.
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After the ROC regime was forced to relocate itself in Taiwan, it became
“politically, economically, and militarily dependent on the US” (Shaw, 1999, p. 114).
To secure its national survival at the time and potential retake of the mainland in the
near future with further US support, the ROC ambassador to the US clarified his
government’s position in a memorandum on March 15, 1971 as follows:
Since the conclusion of the second world war, the United States government
assumed military occupation over the islands located south of 29 north latitude
pursuant to Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty; the Tiao-yu-t’ai Islets were also
included within the boundaries of United States occupation, which the ROC
government did not express its objection due to regional security concerns. However,
this may not be interpreted as [my government’s] acquiescence to the Tiao-yu-t’ai
Islets being a part of the Okinawa Islands. (As cited in Shaw, 1999, p. 113)
Thus, cooperation and compromise are offered for “regional security
concerns.” At the same time, these tactics are also applied when Taiwan emphasizes
that the Tiao-yu-t’ai Islets or Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are separate from the Okinawa
Islands. Below is another example of the present-day government in Taiwan.
The government of Taiwan today is clear that its principal goal is to “obtain
fair access for its fishermen to the waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, waters
that have been traditional fishing grounds for Taiwanese fishermen for centuries”
(Romberg, 2013, p. 6). This is why the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement was signed on
April 10, 2013. The agreement “will protect the rights and interests of Taiwanese
fishermen operating within a designated zone and extend their fishing area by an
additional 1,400 square nautical miles” (Taibei Economic and Cultural Office in
Vancouver, 2013, para. 1). Hailed as “a landmark agreement on protection of each
jurisdiction’s fishing rights in their overlapping territories near the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands,” (Library of Congress, 2013, para. 1), the agreement best represents President
Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative and East China Sea Peace Initiative
Implementation Guidelines.
The assertive and ambitious Chinese. During the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
disputes, China has been taking the assertive and ambitious approaches. That is,
China “uses an action by another party as justification to push back hard and change
the facts on the ground in its favor” (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 12). \
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In response to the US position to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes and
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, China has been both firmly assertive and
strategically ambitious. In June 1971 when the US returned the Ryukyu Islands
together with the disputed islands to Japan, the government of PRC published a
statement, denouncing that “the treaty violated the United Nations Declaration on
January 1, 1942, the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreements, the Potsdam
Declaration and Agreement, and the Basic Post-Surrender Policy of the Far Eastern
Commission” (Price, 2001, p. 3). In November 1971, when the Okinawa Reversion
Agreement was ratified, the US Department of State emphasized that the US took a
neutral position with regard to the competing Japanese and Chinese claims to the
sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The change in the US position may be
partially related to China’s firm reaction.
Aware of the Thucydides Trap which goes, “in 11 of 15 cases since 1500
where a rising power emerged to challenge a ruling power, war occurred” (Abahachi,
2012, para. 2), China did not object to the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.
Although “many Chinese believe strongly that the United States is making every effort
to prevent China from rising up in order to keep its own primacy in the world,”
(Kato, 2012), still “China welcomes a constructive role by the United States in
promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific” (Speech by Vice
President Xi Jinping, 2012, p. 4). Furthermore, the Chinese leadership proposed the
concept of a new type of great power relationship. President Xi remarked, “the two
sides must work together to build a new model of major country relationship based
on mutual respect and win-win cooperation for the benefit of the Chinese and
American peoples, and people elsewhere in the world” (Remarks after Bilateral
Meeting, 2013, para. 27). President Obama agreed by saying, “I am very much looking
forward to this being a strong foundation for the kind of new model of cooperation
that we can establish for years to come” (Remarks before Bilateral Meeting, 2013,
para. 9).
Nevertheless, in response to the 2012 Japanese purchase of three of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Chinese top leaders took turns and responded with
“illegal and invalid” (Yamamoto, 2012, para. 1) from then President Hu Jintao, “never
yielding an inch” (para. 11) from then Premier Wen Jiaobao, and “resolute opposition
and strong protest” (para. 10) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. Besides
the verbal counter-measures, a series of action blows were aimed at Japan.
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On September 10, 2012, China announced territorial sea baselines around the
islands and the names and coordinates of 17 base points. Two days later, China
Meteorological Administration started providing weather forecasts for the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands area. On December 14, China submitted its proposals for
the extended continental shelf to the UN Continental Shelf Commission. The
issuance of the sea baselines “placed the disputed islands under Chinese
administration and entrance by Japanese vessels would be considered intrusions into
China’s territory and a violation of its sovereignty” (International Crisis Group, 2013,
p. 11). On Nov. 23, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of PRC announced its
aircraft rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, which covers
the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Qiang, 2013, p. 1). Now, the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands are under routine patrol by Chinese surveillance airplanes and vessels, with the
status quo changed from mere Japanese control to overlapping administration.
Grand Strategies
The grand strategy of Japan. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes began
when Japan implemented its imperial state policies of expansion since the Meiji
Restoration in 1868. In the process of “self-removal from the Sino-centric system,”
(Goh, 2011, p. 4) and modernizing their country by embracing Europe, the Japanese
gained their “self-image of themselves as a ‘citizen-subject’ of an integrated nation”
(Kim, 2012, p. 2). Their “sense of superiority to Asian neighbors grew to create
Asianism that would justify invading neighboring countries,” which was gradually
developed from the “Greater East Union Theory,” “Ideals of the East,” and “Treatise
on Greater Asianism” (Shi, 2008, pp. 2-3). During the First and Second Sino-Japanese
Wars, Asianism evolved into the “aggressive theory of East League and Greater Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere” (p. 4). Under such grand strategies, Japan integrated the
Ryukyu Kingdom as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879, incorporated the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands in 1895, and colonized Taiwan from 1895 to 1945 and Korea from 1910 to
1945. Japan also invaded China and many other Asian countries as well as the US
from 1937 to 1945.
At present, the Abe Administration of Japan has been steadfastly determined
to “assume its rightful place as a major international power” (The International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2013, p. 2) by stimulating Japan’s economy with
“Abenomics” and expanding its army with the revision of Article 9 in its constitution.
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The present-day version of the Japanese grand strategy results from the Abe
Administration’s “larger effort to create something, akin to a ‘concert of democracies’
as a revival of the first Abe government’s interest in ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ or
‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (p. 3). The idea is to “ counter China’s growing
influence by linking together states with similar values stretching from East Asia
through the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe” (p. 3). In the Forward to
the Defense of Japan 2013 (Annual White Paper), it is written in black and white:
With the rapid expansion and intensification of activities by China in the
waters and airspace around Japan…, the government has decided to increase the
defense-related budget practically for the first time in 11 years to strengthen our
defense posture. (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2013).
It is clear that China is regarded as a source of threat to the national security
of Japan. As its grant strategy today, Japan plans to become a normal state and join
the UN Security Council for regional and global leadership on the one hand. On the
other hand, Japan prepares to revise its pacifist constitution and reinforce the USJapan alliance for the expansion and strengthening of its defensive coast guards today
and preemptive military forces tomorrow. Only when Japan genuinely reflects on the
lessons of its defeat in the Second World War for peaceful co-existence and mutual
prosperity with other nations, can it finalize its dream of normal statehood.
The grand strategy of the US. With a military expenditure nearly as much
as that of the rest of world combined, the US has “labored for more than a century to
gain regional hegemony. As a regional hegemony, the US makes sure that no other
great power dominates either Asia or Europe the way it does” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p.
238). Mearsheimer (2010) further clarified, it is “the US Manifest Destiny to expand
America’s boundaries from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean” (p. 238). In the
National Security Strategy of 2002, Former US President George W. Bush (2001)
explicitly stated, “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries
from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of
the United States (para. 7). This is why, during the Cold War from 1945 to 1991, the
US stepped into the breach between China and Japan and provided them with “dual
reassurance, simultaneously guaranteeing China and Japan their security against each
other and obviating the need for them to engage in direct security competition”
(Christensen, 1999, p. 50).
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With the shared Soviet threat disappearing at the end of the Cold War,
cooperation between the US and China turned into competition and containment.
To play balance for its long-term goals, the US authorized Japan the
administration, legislation, and jurisdiction power over the Diaoyu/Senakaku Islands
but sovereignty. Just as Blanchard (2000) put it, “what the US was giving to Japan
with one hand, it was taking away with the other” (p. 120). The US has also repeatedly
stated that “it remains an observer in the ongoing East China Sea dispute over
sovereignty, but it has sided with Tokyo in claiming that the Senkaku Islands fall
under the administrative control of Japan and under the US-Japan Security
Agreement” (Arai, Goto & Wang, 2013, p. 6). In brief, the “Diaoyu/Senkaku problem
arose both directly and indirectly as a consequence of the US Cold War policy in East
Asia” (Koo, 2009, p. 228). For its grand strategy of hegemonic supremacy, especially
its rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region, the US does not want to see a close ChinaJapan relationship, which may affect its ring-holding tactic and long-term strategy. In
the process of establishing and maintaining its hegemonic supremacy, the US has
both gains and losses, exerting favorable and unfavorable impact in an immeasurable
degree upon the rest of the world all the time. To guarantee long-term, mutual
benefits for itself and the rest of the world, the US ought to outwit other nations
without taking advantage of any of them by sowing or reaping conflicts.
The grand strategy of Taiwan. During the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
disputes, the government of Taiwan has been trying hard to make its voice heard and
national interests realized. First, it claims the disputed islands as “an inherent part of
the territory of the Republic of China (ROC)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROCb,
p. 1). Then, President Ma proposed his East China Sea Peace Initiative on August 5,
2012 and East China Sea Peace Initiative Implementation Guidelines on September 7,
2012. Still then, in terms of real actions, the government of Taiwan summoned Sumio
Tarui, Japan’s representative to Taiwan on September 11, 2012 and met Tadashi Imai,
president of Japan’s Interchange Association on September 25, 2012 respectively to
“strongly protest Japan’s purchase of three islets of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands”
(The Central News Agency, pp. 2-3). In addition, groups of Taiwanese, escorted by
their coast guard vessels, managed to land on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands waiving
flags or leaving marks or sailed into the disputed waters to declare sovereignty quite a
number of times, such as September 1960, October 1996, and July 2012, to name a
few. Finally, at the dismay of PRC, Taiwan went ahead and signed the Taiwan-Japan
Fisheries Agreement on April 10, 2013.
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Thus, Taiwan has adopted a grand strategy of accommodation and
cooperation for its “confidence building and economic integration” (Zhang, 2011, p.
269). Hopefully, Taiwan can continue playing its cautious and constructive role
among the three overwhelmingly powerful partners and prove to be the best though
as the weakest.
The grand strategy of China. While including the sovereignty over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as part of its core interests, China has been realizing its
military strategic goals of breaking through the first island chain, developing a blue sea
navy, and “venturing into the global maritime domain, a sphere long dominated by
the US Navy” (US Department of Defense, 2011, p. 1). As a grand strategy, China has
been emphasizing the realization of the Chinese Dream of “economic prosperity,
national renewal, and people’s well-being” (Remarks by President Obama and
President Xi Jinping, June 8, 2013, p. 2). Connecting the Chinese Dream with the
American Dream, President Xi of China hoped for “cooperation, development, peace
and win-win” (p. 2).
In practice, China has been implementing its grand strategy through internal
and external balancing. Internally, China continues with the realization of its peaceful
development by accelerating economic growth, building up defensive military forces,
and creating a favorable international environment. Externally, China has been
engaging in its charming diplomacy of a rising power by joining and creating
multilateral institutions and increasing or enhancing complementary and cooperative
international relationships. To avoid directly provoking unfavorable responses from
the US, China’s grand strategy is meant to “maintain balance among competing
priorities for sustaining momentum in national economic development” and
“maintain favorable trends in the security environment within which such economic
development can occur” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 9). In the words
of Lee Kuan Yew, former president of Singapore:
The Chinese have concluded that their best strategy is to build a strong a
prosperous future, and use their huge and increasingly kighly skilled and educated
workers to out-sell and out-build all others…. The Chinese are not stupid. They will
avoid the mistakes made by Germany and Japan.” (Allison, Blackwill, & Wyne, 2013,
p. 5)
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We can see that, as the second largest economy in the world now with a
continuous economic growth, China is still cautious but gradually assertive on the
international arena. To realize its long-term goal as a rising power, it has been revising
Deng Xiaoping’s guideline of “keeping a low profile and achieving something” for its
foreign policy in the 1990s to “upholding a low profile and actively achieving
something” in the present-day world (Fravel, 2012, para. 2). There have been
systematic misunderstandings and increasing concerns from not only Japan and the
US but other relevant nations as well regarding China’s growing military power and
vague future ambitions. Thus, clearer and better communication with the rest of the
world should be integrated into its charming diplomatic policies and new big power
relationship theory.
Conclusion
The purposes of this study were to explore the communication tactics and
grand strategies of each of the involved parties in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
disputes. Under the theoretical guidance of the arguments between liberal optimists
and realist pessimists and through the research method of hermeneutics, we have
achieved two main research findings. As the answer to the first research question
concerning the communication tactics of the four involved parties in the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes, Japan has been secretive and opportunistic, the US
calculated and one-sided, Taiwan cooperative and compromising, and the Chinese
assertive and ambitious.
As the answer to the second research question regarding the grand strategies
of the four parties in the process of the disputes, Japan plans to become a normal
state and join the UN Security Council for regional and global leadership on the one
hand. On the other hand, Japan prepares to revise its pacifist constitution and
reinforce the US-Japan alliance for the expansion and strengthening of its defensive
coast guards today and preemptive military forces tomorrow. For the hegemonic
supremacy in the world, especially its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, the US
makes sure that it has no rivals in all aspects regardless of its close ally Japan or tradepartner China. To raise the confidence level of its political identity and economic
integration, Taiwan effectively adopted a grand strategy of accommodation and
cooperation. Finally, it is the grand strategy of China to pursue its peaceful
development by accelerating economic growth, building up defensive military forces,
and creating a favorable international environment.
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In our study, we have found the arguments of both liberal optimists and
realist pessimists applicable and helpful. The grand strategies of Japan, the US and
China, which are weighted more towards national interests and state power, are
projected along the trajectory of the realist pessimists. However, the grand strategy of
Taiwan and some part of it of China are inclined towards cooperation and
interdependence as advocated by the liberal optimists. In fact, as the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands disputes are complicated, multifaceted, and dynamic in nature, all the involved
parties have been shifting their verbal and nonverbal communication messages
between constraint and aggressiveness in accordance with their respective priorities
on other state, bilateral, or international affairs.
Using the research method of hermeneutics, we successfully sought relevant
speeches or remarks of governmental officials, official statements, and historical
records. We also found interview transcripts of scholars and experts, media reports
and readers’ online responses. For the generation of themes as research findings and
insightful knowledge of the phenomenon under study, the research method greatly
helped us conducting a careful analysis and thorough interpretation of the selected
artifacts, by connecting the origin of the texts closely with their historical and cultural
contexts.
In conclusion, the issue of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands may continue to be
negotiable and resolvable disputes, and it can also become non-negotiable and
unresolvable conflicts or a frequent trigger of a potential war. It is a test of the
wisdom and communication competence of the four involved parties not only in the
communication tactics but also grand strategies. The Asia-Pacific region is considered
a “key engine for the global economy” (VOA, 2013, p. 1), with half of the world’s
population, 56% of the world economic output, and 70% percent of the earth’s
surface. Hopefully, the interlocked relations among the world’s top economies will
adjust their grand strategies and implement their communication tactics for the longterm prosperity of their respective nations and genuine peace of the entire world.
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Notes
1. Speeches and remarks: Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping
on June 8, 2013; Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping on
June 7, 2013; Speech by Vice President Xi Jinpingon Feb. 15, 2012; Secretary
of State Clinton’s Remarks: America’s Pacific Century in November 2011;
Secretary of State Clinton’s Remarks with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham
Gia Khiem on Oct. 30, 2010;
2. Official statements and news releases: US Senate Resolution 167 on June 10,
2013; The Basic View of Japan in Feburay 2013; Q&A of Japan in 2013;
Defense of Japan 2013 (Annual White Paper); White Paper of PRC on Sept.
10, 2012; Official Statement of ROC; East China Sea Peace Initiative and East
China Sea Peace Initiative Implementation Guidelines of ROC; Annual
Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006;
3. Historical records: CIA Report of The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Oil Under
Troubled Waters in May 1971; CIA Report of The Ryukyu Islands and Their
Significance on Aug. 6, 1948; Congressional Record—Senate on Nov. 29,
2012; Okinawa Reversion Treaty on June 17, 1971; Foreign relations of the
United States diplomatic papers, 1943; Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895;
The Cairo Declaration on Dec. 1, 1943;
4. Interview transcripts: Panel Interview by the Federal News Service on May 15,
2013; Interview with Wang Jisi on Oct. 5, 2012;
5. Media reports and readers’ online responses: See references
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